ABSTRACT Based on users' permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys (randomness secret values), authenticated key agreement (AKA) protocols are used to construct a common session key between two session parties while authenticating each other. Recently, the design of leakage-resilient AKA (LR-AKA) resisting side-channel attacks has received significant attention from researchers. By sidechannel attacks, an adversary is allowed to obtain fractional leakage information of private (secret) keys during the computation rounds of LR-AKA protocols. However, most LR-AKA protocols have a restriction, namely, the overall fractional leakage information must be bounded. In this paper, we propose an efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage extended CanettiKrawczyk model. Security analysis is given to demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the generic bilinear group model. By comparisons, our protocol is better than the previously proposed LR-AKA protocols in terms of computation cost, security model, and leakage properties.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, side-channel attacks have received significant attention from researchers because most of the existing cryptographic schemes/protocols did not resist this kind of attacks. Side-channel attacks mean that, when users execute these cryptographic schemes/protocols, adversaries could obtain fractional leakage information of the permanent/ephemeral private (secret) keys of users by employing several particular properties, such as differential power consumption [1] , fault/bug attacks [2] , [3] and timing attacks [4] , [5] . Indeed, most adversary models or security notions did not concern with side-channel attacks, where they have assumed that fractional leakage information of the private (secret) keys of users could not be leaked to adversaries. Therefore, these cryptographic schemes/protocols could be broken in an environment with side-channel attacks.
Leakage-resilient cryptography is an emerging approach of resisting side-channel attacks. Indeed, the cryptographic schemes/protocols based on leakage-resilient cryptography must tolerate the fractional leakage of private (secret) keys while retaining security. Recently, numerous leakageresilient signature schemes [6] - [10] , and leakage-resilient encryption schemes [11] - [15] have been proposed. Since authenticated key agreement (AKA) is an important cryptographic primitive, it is critical to study leakage-resilient AKA (LR-AKA) protocols.
Based on users' permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys (randomness secret values), AKA protocols are used to construct a common session key between two communication parties while authenticating each other. For the security model, Bellare and Rogaway [16] presented the first adversary model of AKA protocols. Afterward, Canetti and Krawczyk [17] extended Bellare and Rogaway's model to present a new adversary model, called CK model. Since the CK model did not address several possible attacks, LaMacchia et al. [18] further presented the extended Canetti−Krawczyk (eCK) model by considering stronger adversaries, who can compromise either permanent private keys or ephemeral secret keys. The eCK model has widely been used to show the security of AKA protocols [19] - [22] . However, the aforementioned AKA models and protocols did not take into account side-channel attacks with fractional leakage of permanent/ephemeral private (secret) keys. In this article, we will aim at the design of an efficient LR-AKA protocol with strong security properties, especially overall unbounded leakage property and capturing general leakage attacks.
A. RELATED WORK
Indeed, the construction of LR-AKA protocols can be constructed straightforwardly by employing leakage-resilient encryption or signature schemes. Several LR-AKA protocols have been proposed. In 2009, Alwen et al. [23] employed a secure signature scheme to propose a leakageresilient AKA protocol. Afterward, Dodis et al. [24] proposed two LR-AKA protocols by, respectively, employing leakage-resilient encryption and signature schemes. Meanwhile, they also proved that both protocols are secure in the leakage-resilient CK model of LR-AKA protocols. Moreover, by combing a secure AKA protocol under CK model and a random message unforgeable signature scheme, Yang et al. [25] proposed a secure LR-AKA protocol in the leakage-resilient CK model and the auxiliary input model. It is obvious that the leakage-resilient CK model did not address the compromise of ephemeral secret keys.
Moreover, Moriyama and Okamoto [26] introduced a leakage-resilient eCK model of LR-AKA protocols while proposing a concrete LR-AKA protocol to concern with the compromise of ephemeral secret keys. However, their LR-AKA protocol concerned with only the fractional leakage of the permanent private key, but not the ephemeral secret key. Very recently, to address the security incompleteness of the aforementioned LR-AKA protocols, Chen et al. [27] proposed a new adversary model, termed leakage-resilient eCK model with auxiliary inputs. Their model allows the fractional leakage of both the permanent private key and ephemeral secret key while enabling an adversary to issue leakage queries during the challenge session of LR-AKA protocols. Nevertheless, the LR-AKA protocols mentioned above have the restriction that the total amount of fractional leakage information must be bounded, called the bounded leakage model.
Alawatugoda et al. [28] and [29] presented a generic leakage-resilient eCK model of LR-AKA protocols, called after-the-fact leakage eCK model. In this model, adversaries are also allowed to obtain fractional leakage information of the permanent/ephemeral private (secret) keys even after the session key is established during the test/challenge session. In addition, the after-the-fact leakage eCK model has two variants, namely, bounded leakage and continual leakage. The former bounds the total amount of fractional leakage information of each user's permanent/ephemeral private (secret) keys for the entire protocol execution, whereas the continual leakage variant allows adversaries to reveal a fixed amount of leakage for each protocol session while possessing overall unbounded leakage property during protocol execution. Alawatugoda et al. [29] also proposed a concrete construction of LR-AKA protocol. However, the proposed LR-AKA protocol is only secure in the bounded leakage variant of after-the-fact leakage eCK model. Afterwards, Alawatugoda et al. [30] proposed the first concrete and secure LR-AKA protocol in the continual leakage variant of after-the-fact leakage eCK model (abbreviated ''continual leakage eCK model''). They employed Dziembowski and Faust's key refreshing technique [31] to update the permanent private keys after each protocol session. However, the key refreshing procedure adopts the inner-product extractor method to compute the next permanent private key so that the required computational cost is heavy for achieving secure key refreshing procedure. The secure key refreshing procedure is a protocol which requires O(n 2 ) computation operation, where n is a security parameter and depends on the leakage amount in each round of the secure key refreshing procedure. Indeed, Alawatugoda et al. [30] pointed out that it is worthwhile to investigate other techniques to realize continual after-the-fact leakage resilience LR-AKA protocol without inner-product extractor method.
B. CONTRIBUTION AND ORGANIZATION
In this article, we propose a novel and efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage eCK model. In the continual leakage eCK model, our LR-AKA protocol allows adversaries to obtain fractional leakage information of both user's permanent private keys and ephemeral secret keys involved in the session key after the test/challenge session. The point is that the security model possesses the overall unbounded leakage property [13] . As the splitting storage idea [31] , we also partition a permanent private key into two components, and refresh these two components by employing the multiplicative blinding technique [13] , [15] , [32] instead of the timeconsuming inner-product extractor method. In this case, two new components of the permanent private key can be re-used safely since the leakage would be restricted to two ''current'' components and therefore no adversary can learn the useful information about a permanent private key.
In the generic bilinear group model [33] , we demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the continual leakage eCK model. Table 1 lists the property comparisons among the aforementioned protocols [23] - [27] , [29] , [30] and our LR-AKA protocol in terms of AKA model, admitted leakage of randomness, overall leakage amount and computational cost. Obviously, our protocol is better than the others. Finally, performance analysis is made to demonstrate that the proposed LR-AKA protocol is suitable for both PC and mobile devices.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section II gives preliminaries that include the generic bilinear group model and the associated assumptions. In Section III, the framework and security notions of LR-AKA protocols in the continual leakage eCK model are presented. A novel and efficient LR-AKA protocol with overall unbounded leakage property is proposed in Section IV. Security analysis of our LR-AKA protocol is presented in Section V. Section VI demonstrates performance analysis. Finally, conclusions are given in Section VII.
II. PRELIMINARIES
Here, we compendiously present properties of bilinear groups [34] , [35] and entropy, concepts of the generic bilinear group model [9] , [32] , [33] , and several associated hard assumptions.
A. BILINEAR GROUPS
Let G be a multiplicative cyclic group generated by g and let its order be a large prime p. Let G T be also a multiplicative cyclic group of the same order p. An admissible bilinear pairing is a mapê: G × G → G T which possesses the following properties:
can be computed efficiently. For the admissible mapê, G and G T are called a bilinear group and the target group of the mapê, respectively. In addition, e(g, g) may be viewed as a generator of G T , denoted by g T . Such groups appear in hyper-elliptic curves or supersingular elliptic curves over finite field. We refer the reader to [34] and [35] for further details.
B. GENERIC BILINEAR GROUP MODEL
The generic group model is an adversary model for cryptographic schemes and protocols, which was first proposed by Shoup [36] . Based on the generic group model, Boneh et al. [33] further present the generic bilinear group model by adding bilinear pairing operation. The generic bilinear group model involves three group operations, namely, a multiplication in a group G, a multiplication in a group G T and a bilinear pairingê between G and G T . When an adversary would like to perform a group operation, it just issues a group query (oracle) to a challenger. Upon receiving this group query, the challenger uses the two elements to generate third element in G, records it in a list and sends it to the adversary. Namely, the adversary may have access to a randomly chosen element (encoding) of a group, which is maintained and controlled by the challenger.
In the generic bilinear group model, the elements of a group are encoded with bit strings. In such a case, the elements of G and G T are, respectively, encoded to bit strings by using two random injective maps ψG: Z p → and ψT : Z p → T , where both and T are sets of bit strings while satisfying
and Q p denote, respectively, group queries (oracles) on the multiplication operation in G, the multiplication operation in G T and the bilinear pairing operationê. For any a, b ∈ Z * p , the following properties hold.
It is worth mentioning that ψG(1) = g and ψT (1) = e(g, g) = g T are generators of G and G T , respectively. One main employment of the generic bilinear group model is to analyze computational hardness assumptions. In the generic bilinear group model, if an adversary with non-negligible probability can find a collision element for a group operation, we say that it solves the computational hardness assumption, i.e. solving the discrete logarithm problem in the multiplicative group G or G T .
Definition 1: Discrete logarithm (DL) problem and its associated assumption: Given two group elements P, Q ∈ G, where G is a multiplicative cyclic group with order to be a large prime p. The DL problem in G is to compute an integer c ∈ Z * p such that Q = P c , where P is a generator of G. The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A in solving the DL problem in G is defined by
The DL assumption is that the advantage Adv CDH A is negligibly small for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm A [33] .
In addition, we also need another computational hardness assumption in our protocol.
where G is a multiplicative cyclic group with order to be a large prime p and with a generator g. The CDH problem in G is to compute g ab . The advantage of any PPT algorithm A in solving the CDH problem in G is defined by Adv CDH
The CDH assumption is that the advantage Adv CDH A is negligibly small [37] for any PPT algorithm A.
C. ENTROPY
Entropy is used to measure the amount of all possible statuses (states) in thermodynamic equilibrium systems. Indeed, the statistical exposition of entropy is able to evaluate the probability estimation of uncertainty. Let X be a discrete random variable which takes on a finite set of values
Moreover, the min-entropy of a random variable denotes the measure of the largest probability (worst-case predictability). The average conditional min-entropy of a random variable denotes the measure of the worst-case predictability under a correlated discrete random variable with some events. We formally define the two kinds of min-entropies as below.
1.
the average conditional min-entropy of the discrete random variable X under the correlated discrete random variable Y with an event Y = y. In the leakage circumstance, to measure the average conditional min-entropy of a discrete random variable (i.e. a private/secret key), Dodis et al. [38] presented the following consequence.
Lemma 1: Given a discrete random variable X , let f (X ) denote the fractional leakage information on X , where f :x→ {0, 1} λ is a leakage function on X and the output bit-length of f is limited to λ bits. The average conditional min-entropy of the discrete random variable X under the fractional leakage information f (X ) satisfies the inequality
Based on the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [39] , [40] , Galindo and Vivek [9] demonstrated the property of probability distributions of a non-zero polynomial under a leakage function with the maximal output bit-length λ as below.
Lemma 2:
. . , W n ] denote a nonzero polynomial of total degree d with the probability distri-
III. ADVERSARY MODEL AND SECURITY NOTIONS
In the section, we introduce the security notions of the continual leakage variant of after-the-fact leakage eCK model [30] , i.e. the continual leakage eCK model. We first present properties of the continual leakage model.
A. CONTINUAL LEAKAGE MODEL
The continual leakage model is used to model the leakage abilities of an adversary, which allows an adversary to continually reveal a fixed amount of leakage for each protocol session while possessing overall unbounded leakage property during the whole system lifecycle [9] , [13] , [32] . To achieve the overall unbounded leakage property, private (secret) keys must provide the stateful property. To do so, each private (secret) key is partitioned into two components and stored in different places of the memory. Generally, a cryptographic protocol/scheme comprises several computation rounds. After (or before) executing a computation round in the cryptographic protocol/scheme, the system refreshes the involved private (secret) key while the associated public key remains unchanged. In the following, we summarize four properties of the continual leakage model.
-Only computation leakage: Only the fractional leakage information of permanent/temporary private (secret) keys involved or accessed in the current computation round could be revealed to a side-channel adversary. -Bounded leakage of single computation round: The amount of fractional leakage information in a single computation round is limited to some λ bits. Namely, the leakage information of each computation round is bounded to a fraction of private (secret) keys. -Independent leakage between computation rounds: The leakage information of the computation rounds is independent with each other. -Overall unbounded leakage: The total amount of leakage information is unbounded, namely, it possesses overall unbounded leakage property during the whole system lifecycle. Thus, after (or before) executing a computation round, the system refreshes the involved or accessed private (secret) keys.
B. THE ADVERSARIAL MODEL OF THE LR-AKA PROTOCOL
As mentioned earlier, the eCK model of AKA protocols introduced by LaMacchia et al. [18] is an accredited adversary model and has been widely used to show the security of AKA protocols. Based on the eCK model, several leakage-resilient eCK models [26] - [30] have been presented. Alawatugoda et al. ' s continual leakage eCK model [29] , [30] is the most accredited model, which allows an adversary to ask all kinds of queries as the abilities of the adversary in the eCK model. In addition, the adversary may also issue leakage queries to obtain the fractional leakage information of permanent/ephemeral private (secret) keys. Typically, a AKA protocol consists of two phases, namely, initial setup phase and session key construction phase. In the continual leakage eCK model, the session key construction phase of leakage-resilient (LR)-AKA protocols is further divided to two sub-phases, namely, key refreshing and key agreement. Here, private keys denote the private keys involved in the computations of the key refreshing and key agreement subphases while ephemeral secret keys denote the ephemeral secret keys involved in the computation of the key agreement sub-phase. Based on the continual leakage eCK model, we present the associated security game G CL−eCK that is played by an adversary A and a challenger B. Let the adversary A be a q-query probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm that can issue queries to the challenger B at most q times. Let the oracle s i is denote the s-th session of the user with identity ID i .
GAME G CL−eCK
In the game G CL−eCK , there are two phases, namely, Initial Setup and Query. The adversary A may issue six kinds of queries in any order for totally at most q times in the Query phase. A wins the game if A can determine whether or not a bit string is the real session key at the end of the game. Two phases are described as below:
-Initial Setup: The challenger B generates the system parameters and then sends the public parameters to the adversary A. -Query: In this phase, A can issue the following six queries adaptively for totally at most q times.
• 
IV. THE PROPOSED LR-AKA PROTOCOL
In this section, we propose a novel and efficient LR-AKA protocol in the continual leakage eCK model. Our LR-AKA protocol consists of two phases, initial setup and session key construction. Moreover, the session key construction phase consists of two sub-phases including the key refreshing and key agreement. In the following, we demonstrate how Alice and Bob construct a common session key by using our LR-AKA protocol.
-Initial setup phase: Given the security parameter κ, the system first generates the bilinear groups {p, G, G T , g,ê} as defined in Section 2.1. Moreover, an additional generator h ∈ G is randomly chosen. Let the public parameters PP be {G, G T ,ê, p, g, h}. Without loss of generality, Alice and Bob generate their own private key pairs and public key pair as follows. Also, see Fig. 1 .
• Alice first picks two random values a, α 0 ∈ Z * p , and computes two initial private key pairs (SA 0,1 , SA 0,2 ) = (g α 0 , g a−α 0 ) and (XA 0,1 , XA 0,2 ) = (ê (SA 0,1 , h),ê(SA 0,2 , h) ). Obviously, we have SA = SA 0,1 · SA 0,2 = g a and XA = XA 0,1 · XA 0,2 =ê(g a , h). Alice computes the public key pair (TA, PA) = (ê(g, SA),ê(g, g) XA ) . • Similarly, Bob picks two random values b, β 0 ∈ Z * p , and computes two private key pairs and the public key pair as Alice did. Bob's two initial private key pairs are (SB 0,1 , SB 0,2 ) and (XB 0,1 , XB 0,2 ) while the public key pair is (TB, PB) = (ê(g, SB),ê(g, g) • Key refreshing: Alice chooses a random number α i ∈ Z * p and refreshes her private key pairs by
. By the same way, Bob also picks a random number β j ∈ Z * p and refreshes his private key pairs (SB j,1 , SB j,2 ) = (SB j−1,1 · g β j , SB j−1,2 · g −β j ) and (XB j,1 , XB j,2 ) = (XB j−1,1 ·ê(g β j , h), XB j−1,2 ·ê(g −β j , h)). This key refreshing procedure adopts the so-called multiplicative blinding technique. Obviously, we have
• Key agreement: Alice chooses an ephemeral secret key x, computes X = g x and sends the value X to Bob. Bob also chooses an ephemeral secret key y, computes Y = g y and sends the value Y to Alice. By using Bob's public key (TB, PB) and Y , and her own current private key pairs (SA i,1 , SA i,2 ) and (XA i,1 , XA i,2 ), Alice computes a session key SK A,i as below:
Similarly, Bob uses his current private key pairs (SB j,1 , SB j,2 ) and (XB j,1 , XB j,2 ) to compute a session key SK B,j as below: 
Hence, we have SK A,i = SK B,j .
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the security analysis of our LR-AKA protocol in the continual leakage eCK model. Based on the generic bilinear group model [13] , [32] , [33] , we demonstrate that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the continual leakage eCK model.
Theorem 1:
Assume that A is a q-query PPT adversary of the proposed LR-AKA protocol in the continual leakage eCK model. Based on the generic bilinear group model and CDH assumption, the proposed LR-AKA protocol is provably secure.
Proof: Let A be an adversary that can adaptively issue the queries at most q times in the security game G CL−eCK which is played by a challenger B and the adversary A. VOLUME 6, 2018 The advantage that A breaks the proposed LR-AKA protocol is bounded by the success probability of A in the game G CL−eCK . In the adversary model defined in Section 3. 
, where x and y are the ephemeral secret key. However, this is the hard CDH problem and so the advantage that A can obtain g xy is negligibly small. In the continual leakage eCK game G CL−eCK , A can collect at most λ bits leakage information about x or y by issuing the Leak query with two leakage functions h i,s and h j,t , respectively. Since the ephemeral secret key x and y are randomly selected for each session, A can obtain at most λ bits leakage information from each ephemeral secret key. Hence it is hard to determine KA i, 3 or KB j, 3 . Based on the CDH assumption [37] , the probability that A wins the game G CL−eCK is negligibly small. Q.E.D. (= KB j,4 ) . Hence, to obtain the session key, A must be able to compute Lemma 5: Assume that A is a q-query PPT adversary of the proposed LR-AKA protocol in the continual leakage eCK game G CL−eCK . Assume that A is allowed to obtain the ephemeral secret keys of both s i and t j , but not the private key pairs of both s i and t j . Based on the generic bilinear group model, the probability that A wins the continual leakage eCK game G CL−eCK is negligibly small.
Proof: The proof of the lemma is presented in Appendix.
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
The performance analysis of our LR-AKA protocol is given here. We adopt the following notations to analyze the computational costs.
• TG e : The computational cost of a bilinear pairing operationê:
• TG m : The computational cost of an exponentiation operation in G or G T .
Note that the computational cost of the multiplication operation in G or G T is trivial and negligible with compared to TG e and TG m [35] . The simulation results in [41] - [43] on mobile device and PC are treated as the benchmark of evaluating the running time of TG e and TG m . The mobile device is a Linux personal digital assistant (PDA) with a PXA270 624-MHz processor. The PC is equipped with a Pentium 3 GHz processor under Microsoft window system. In addition, for the equivalent level of 1024-bit RSA security, the employed bilinear pairings (i.e. Tate pairings) are defined over the elliptic curve E/F p : y 2 = x 3 + x with embedding degree 2, where p is a 512-bit prime such that p + 1 = 12qr while q is a 160-bit prime. Table 2 lists the running time (in milliseconds) of two operations on mobile device and PC, respectively. In Table 3 , we list the computational cost and running time (in milliseconds) of three phases in the proposed LR-AKA protocol. By Table 3 , the performance of our protocol is not only suiting for the platforms of PC but also for mobile devices.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the article, we proposed a novel and efficient LR-AKA protocol by using the multiplicative blinding technique instead of the time-consuming inner-product extractor method to achieve key refreshing. The idea of the multiplicative blinding technique in the continual leakage eCK model is to partition the private key into two components while the leakage of two components is independent each other. After two current components are involved to construct a session key, they must be refreshed to become two new components of the private key for reuse. By the key refreshing method, the proposed LR-AKA protocol possesses overall unbounded leakage property because an adversary can only learn fractional leakage information of two current components. In the generic bilinear group (GBG) model, we demonstrated that our LR-AKA protocol is provably secure in the continual leakage eCK model. In addition, performance analysis demonstrated that the proposed LR-AKA protocol is suitable for both mobile device and PC. A more challenging issue is to propose a LR-AKA protocol without random oracle model while possessing overall unbounded leakage property in the continual leakage eCK model.
APPENDIX PROOF OF LEMMA 5
Proof: By assumption, A may obtain the ephemeral secret keys x and y of both 
. In the following, we prove that the advantage that A wins the game G CL−eCK is negligibly small, based on the generic bilinear group model. In the generic bilinear group model, the elements of a group are encoded with bit strings. In order for A to perform the multiplication operation on G, the multiplication operation on G T and the bilinear pairing operationê, the adversary A should be able to issue associated group queries (oracles). Hence, in the following, we modify the game G CL−eCK defined in Section 3.2 by adding these three group queries Q G , Q T and Q P .
-Initial Setup: In this phase, the challenger B first builds several lists by performing the following steps:
1. The challenger B builds two lists L G and L T to record pairs of elements in the groups G and G T , respectively.
• The list L G consists of elements of the form (PG m,n,r , ψG m,n,r ). Each PG m,n,r is a multivariate polynomial that consists of a finite numbers of variates in G with coefficients in Z p . For a given PG m,n,r , B uses a bit string ψG m,n,r to communicate with A. Here, the indices m, n and r indicate, respectively, the type of query, n-th query, and the r-th element in G/G T . Two tuples (g, ψG I ,1,1 ) and (h, ψG I ,1,2 ) are initially added in the list L G .
• • B randomly chooses the user's identity ID i ∈ Z * p .
• B picks a new variable T i , and computes four multivariate polynomials: • ψRM i,s : The transcript (bit string) of message sent by partner.
• PRM i,s : The multivariate polynomial of ψRM i,s . 4. At the end of this phase, the challenger B sends the public parameters PP to A (using bit strings). -Query: In this phase, A can issue the following queries adaptively for totally at most q times.
• and L T after all kinds of queries.
• For each query of Q G , Q T or Q P , at most 3 elements are recorded in L G or L T .
• For each Send query, at most 1 new element is recorded in L G or L T .
• For each Reveal query, at most 5 new elements are recorded in L G or L T .
• For each Ephemeral-secret-leakage or Corrupt query, no new element recorded.
• For each Test query, at most 5 new elements are recorded in L G or L T . Let q O denote the total number of group queries Q G , Q T and Q P , and let q S , q R and q T , denote the numbers of Send, Reveal and Test queries, respectively. As before, |L G | and |L T | denote, respectively, the numbers of elements in L G and L T . Then, we have |L G | + |L T | ≤ 2 + 3q O + q S + 5q R + 5 ≤ 5q.
(2) Let us discuss the degrees of polynomials in L G .
• Every polynomial of new variates VG m,n,r , T i and TES i,s in L G has degree 1.
• Every polynomial of the private key PSA i has degree 2.
• In the Reveal query, K 3 and PrM i,s have the same degree.
• In Q G , the degree of PG Q,i,3 is equal to the maximal degree of PG Q,i,1 and PG Q,i,2 , since the polynomial PG Q,i,3 = PG Q,i,1 + PG Q,i,2 . Hence, every polynomial in L G has degree at most 2. (3) Let us discuss the degrees of polynomials in L T .
• Every polynomial of new variates VT m,n,r in L T has degree 1.
• Every polynomial of the private key PXA i = T i ·g·h has degree 3.
• The polynomials of the private key pairs PTA i and PPA i have degrees 3 and 5, respectively.
• In Q P , each polynomial PT P,i,k has degree at most 4 since each polynomial in L G has degree at most 2.
• In the Reveal query, the degree of K 1 = TES i,s · PPNTA is 4, the degree of K 2 = PrM i,s · PSA i is 4, and the degree of K 4 = PPNPA · PXA i is 8.
• , v 2 , . . . , v n ) = PT j (v 1 , v 2 , . . . , v n ).
• Case 2: The adversary A outputs cb = cb after the Test query. In the real adversary game, the advantage of the adversary A in the simulated game G CL−eCK is an upper bound of the success probability of A. For convenience, we first compute A's success probability under the situation that A cannot issue the Leak query in the query phase. Afterwards, we discuss the other situation.
-Without the Leak query: If A does not use the Leak query, the success probability can be computed by the following two cases:
• Case 1: The adversary A can find a collision in G or G T . In this case, A can resolve the discrete logarithm problem in G or G T . Assume that PG i and PG j are two distinct polynomials in L G . We compute the probability of the event when the polynomials PG C = PG i − PG j is a zero polynomial. 
